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CHINA AS A “NATIONAL STRATEGIC 
BUYER”: TOWARD A MULTILATERAL 
REGIME FOR CROSS-BORDER M&A 
Jeffrey N. Gordon* & Curtis J. Milhaupt** 
Unlike the case of cross-border trade, there is no explicit 
international governance regime for cross-border M&A; rather, 
there is a shared understanding that publicly traded 
companies are generally for purchase by any bidder—domestic 
or foreign—willing to offer a sufficiently large premium over a 
target’s stock market price. The unspoken premise that 
undergirds the system is that the prospective buyer is 
motivated by private economic gain-seeking. 
The entry of China into the global M&A market threatens 
the fundamental assumptions of the current permissive 
international regime. China has become a significant player in 
the cross-border M&A market, particularly as an acquirer. The 
central claim of the article is that the cross-border M&A regime 
will require a new rules-of-the-game structure to take account 
of China’s ascension. This is because cross-border M&A with 
China introduces a new dimension: what we call the “national 
strategic buyer” (“NSB”), whose objective is to further the 
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interests of a nation-state in the pursuit of industrial policy or 
out of national security concerns. Thus, China presents a 
problem of asymmetric motives in the global M&A market: 
sellers to Chinese firms have private motives for pursuing 
transactions, while at least some Chinese acquirers have non-
economic motivations. Yet distinguishing commercial and 
financial motives from national strategic motives in Chinese 
firms is difficult. 
To date, the only mechanisms for addressing the NSB 
problem are national security review mechanisms such as the 
CFIUS process in the United States, as recently expanded 
through legislative amendment. The EU is moving forward on 
a screening regulation with a similar objective that 
contemplates activity both by the European Commission and 
the Member States. Whether suitably tailored or not, these 
approaches fail to take on the long-term concern of fully 
assimilating China as a normal actor in the global economic 
system. 
To address the NSB problem, we propose the adoption of a 
multilateral regime under which firms subject to potential 
government influence in their corporate decision-making must 
demonstrate their “eligibility” to engage in outbound M&A. 
For covered firms, the regime would require a commitment to 
exclusively commercial/financial motives in cross-border 
acquisitions, made credible through a corporate governance 
set-up featuring independent directors (selected by foreign 
investors) who publicly verify adherence and disclose the 
source of acquisition financing. Enforcement would consist of 
a secretariat that can evaluate eligibility and monitor post-
acquisition conduct, and national legislation that would 
permit rejection of an acquisition of a local target by an 
acquirer that does not meet the eligibility criteria. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current trade dispute with China, framed in terms of 
the United States-China balance-of-trade deficit, prompts 
reflection once again on the liberal global economic regime 
that has been the premise for the post-World War II global 
order. Economic theory makes it clear that the global welfare-
maximizing trade regime would seek to lower trade barriers 
to permit the pursuit of national comparative advantage in 
both goods and services. National governments, however, face 
ongoing political and economic pressure from local losers as 
well as the consequences of local adjustment costs from the 
global trade regime. Governments may thus incline toward 
protectionist measures that, over time, would undo initial 
commitments to an open trade regime. The ongoing 
maintenance of this liberal global order, therefore, requires a 
structure that creates a binding rules-of-the-game framework 
to constrain national defection and a dispute resolution 
procedure for settling grievances. Enter the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”).  
The regime for the global movement of capital is less well 
developed. The general framework has been permissive and 
facilitative. At times, nations have imposed general capital 
controls, either outbound—to foster in-country investment 
and to reduce exchange rate deterioration—or inbound—to 
avoid boom-and-bust economic cycles and to minimize 
  
No. 1:192] CHINA AS A “NATIONAL STRATEGIC BUYER” 195 
inflation.1 A somewhat different question arises when global 
capital flows take the form of a cross-border acquisition, when 
an acquirer domiciled or headquartered in one country 
acquires a company domiciled or headquartered in another.  
As Figure 1 indicates, cross-border merger and acquisition 
(“M&A”) activity is a consequential form of global economic 
activity. In the post-financial-crisis recovery years (2014–
2017), the annual level of cross-border M&A activity has 
exceeded $1 trillion, and the cross-border share of global M&A 
activity has exceeded forty percent.2  
 
1 See generally DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY 
AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 95–111 (2011); Sebastian 
Edwards, How Effective Are Capital Controls?, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 65, 65 
(1999).  
2 To scale this activity: Trade in merchandise exports and commercial 
services was approximately $20 trillion in 2016. See WTO, WORLD TRADE 
STATISTICAL REVIEW 2017, 100, 104 (2017), https://www.wto.org/english/ 
res_e/statis_e/wts2017_e/wts2017_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL5C-LSQ3]. 
The measures are not directly comparable, of course. Among other things, 
M&A reflects irreversible (or at least long-term) commitments, whereas a 
significant portion of trade reflects spot market transactions or short-term 
contracts. 
  




Unlike the case of cross-border trade, there is no explicit 
international governance regime for cross-border M&A; 
rather, there is a shared understanding that publicly traded 
companies are generally available for purchase to any 
bidder—domestic or foreign—willing to offer a sufficiently 
large premium over a target’s stock market price. This 
expectation is, of course, limited by the shifting boundaries of 
host-country protectionism and the prevailing patterns of 
corporate ownership in different countries. But the unspoken 
premise that undergirds the system is that the prospective 
buyer is motivated by private economic gain-seeking. Some 
buyers may be strategic, seeking economies of scale or scope, 
and others may be financial, looking to maximize immediate 
cash flows. These differences, which may elicit different 
target- and host-country responses, are nevertheless similar 
 
3 Deals, THOMSON REUTERS, https://developers.thomsonreuters. 
com/content/deals-mergers-acquisitions-and-new-issues 
[https://perma.cc/R924-L4Z5] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
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in their overarching private objectives: Firms and 
management teams are seeking to advance the economic 
interests of their private owners. 
One particular aspect of the implicit assumptions 
supporting the cross-border M&A regime bears emphasis. It 
is assumed that the state enters the picture on the target side 
only, the sell side. In other words, it is assumed that the 
laissez-faire system is subject to state-level decisions that a 
particular target is not for sale, perhaps because (i) the follow-
on business strategy is anticipated to cost jobs in the target’s 
home country, (ii) the target provides strategic infrastructure 
(like a port or public utility), or (iii) the target is important for 
national security reasons. By contrast, it is assumed that the 
state does not play a directive role in the acquirer’s decision-
making, the buy side. Protectionism and other forms of 
mercantilism have entered as constraints on the pecuniary 
motives of target shareholders, not as industrial policy 
imperatives that outweigh the pecuniary motives of the 
acquirers.4 The relatively bounded nature of state action has 
meant that the permissive international cross-border M&A 
regime could survive and even thrive without the law-making 
and enforcement apparatus of a multilateral regime like the 
WTO.  
China’s entry into the global M&A market threatens the 
fundamental assumptions of the current permissive 
international regime. The rise of China-related M&A reflects 
not only consolidation in China’s domestic economy but, most 
importantly, China’s increasing share of cross-border 
transactions. In 2016, for example, China accounted for $92 
billion of net purchases in cross-border acquisitions, over ten 
percent of the worldwide total and more than the United 
States, with $78 billion.5 A significant fraction of these 
transactions related to critical technology such as 
 
4 See generally I. Serdar Dinc & Isil Erel, Economic Nationalism in 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 68 J. FIN. 2471 (2013). 
5 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment 
Report 2017, at 230–231 (2017). 
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semiconductors,6 domains of an articulated Chinese state 
objective to become a world leader.7 
 The central claim of this Article is that the cross-border 
M&A regime will require a new rules-of-the-game structure to 
take account of China’s ascension. This is because cross-
border M&A with a Chinese acquirer adds a new dimension: 
what this Article will call the “national strategic buyer” 
(“NSB”), whose objective is to further the interests of a nation-
state in the pursuit of national industrial policy or perhaps 
national security concerns. Thus, China presents a problem of 
asymmetric motives in the global M&A market: Sellers to 
Chinese firms have private motives for pursuing transactions, 
while at least some Chinese acquirers have non-economic 
motivations. These acquirers are NSBs. Yet distinguishing 
commercial and financial motives from national strategic 
motives with a given Chinese acquirer is difficult. High levels 
of state ownership, the murkiness of corporate ownership in 
many cases, and the Communist Party’s extensive levers of 
influence over all firms, whether state-owned (“SOE”) or 
privately owned (“POE”), creates the potential for national 
strategic motives to be involved in many transactions. 
Moreover, the Chinese government’s recent clampdown on 
outbound M&A to stem capital flight8 demonstrates that the 
government perceives outbound M&A as closely linked to its 
overall economic strategy and views the administrative 
procedures associated with outbound M&A as an important 
tool of governmental economic control.  
A comparison with France may be useful in illustrating the 
dilemma raised by an NSB. While it may be difficult for a 
foreign acquirer to gain control of a French firm due to the 
relatively statist orientation of that country’s economy, the 
 
6 See THILO HANEMANN, DANIEL H. ROSEN & CASSIE GAO, RHODIUM GRP., 
NAT’L COMM. ON U.S. CHINA RELATIONS, TWO-WAY STREET: 2018 UPDATE US-
CHINA DIRECT INVESTMENT TRENDS 30–34 (Apr. 2018).  
7 See infra text accompanying notes 78–80. 
8 See Don Weinland, China Capital Crackdown Threatens Wave of 
Overseas Buyouts, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/091677dc-f8ec-11e6-bd4e-68d53499ed71 (on file 
with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
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French government is not pursuing a national industrial 
strategy of targeting foreign firms in order to obtain advanced 
technologies9 or regulating the volume of outbound deal flow 
in service of national economic policy.  
The existence of NSBs in the cross-border M&A market 
benefits target company shareholders, who are essentially 
overcompensated for sale of control to the foreign acquirer 
(because a portion of the premium paid for their shares 
reflects the perceived industrial policy benefit to the NSB’s 
home country government). Yet, this may cause distortions in 
the market itself and negative welfare consequences in the 
target company’s home country. These problems are 
elaborated on below,10 but of particular concern is the 
potential loss of long-term innovative capacity and growth 
potential of the United States economy. Transfer of control 
over leading-edge technologies to NSBs may occur on a scale 
that diminishes “agglomeration economies”11 in places like 
Silicon Valley and that shifts the center of innovative gravity 
from the United States to China. 
To date, the only mechanisms for addressing the NSB 
problem are national security review mechanisms for cross-
border acquisitions of domestic targets at the level of separate 
nation-states. In the United States, this mechanism is the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
 
9 This stands in stark contrast to Chinese plans, as evidence through 
that country’s Made in China 2025 plan. See Li Keqiang (李克强), Zhengfu 
Gongzuo Baogao—Erlingyiwu Nian San Yue Wu Ri Zai Di Shi’er Jie 
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Di San Ci Huiyi Shang (政府工作报告——
2015年3月5日在第十二届全国人民代表大会第三次会议上) [Work Report at 
the Third Session of China’s Twelfth National People’s Congress on Mar. 5, 
2015], Xinhua News Agency (Mar. 16, 
2015), http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/ 
2015-03/16/content_2835101.htm (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review); see also infra text accompanying notes 74–80. 
10 See infra Part VI. 
11 Agglomeration economies refers to “the benefits that come when 
firms and people locate near one another together in cities and industrial 
clusters.” Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction, in AGGLOMERATION ECONOMICS 
1 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2010). 
  
200 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
(“CFIUS”).12 Although the precise mechanisms differ, 
Australia, Canada, and a number of other countries have 
adopted similar screening regimes.13 Concern over Chinese 
acquisitions has prompted a recent legislative reform of the 
CFIUS process.14 The reform focuses particularly on the need 
to expand the range of transactions covered by the screening 
mechanism to include not simply foreign acquisitions of 
control, but joint ventures and other deal structures through 
which a foreign participant might potentially extract sensitive 
technology or otherwise exert influence in ways that could 
harm United States national interests.15 Similar concerns 
have produced provisional agreement on a new European 
Union regulation that calls for both European Commission 
screening of “strategic sector” transactions of “Union interest” 
and greater coordination of screening by individual member 
states.16 
 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 87–119. For the origins of the 
Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States in 1975 and its 
activities for the first thirty years, see George Stephanov Georgiev, The 
Reformed CFIUS Regulatory Framework: Mediating Between Continued 
Openness to Foreign Investment and National Security, 25 YALE J. REG. 125 
(2008). 
13 See Frédéric Wehrlé & Joachim Pohl, Investment Policies Related to 
National Security: A Survey of Country Practices (OECD Working Papers 
on Int’l. Inv., No. 2016/02, 2016), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/5jlwrrf038nx-en.pdf?expires=1548013102&id=id&ac 
cname=guest&checksum=E72D2C6145B1DE0CE27E7D6E4FBF4D79 
[https://perma.cc/4CT3-UH72] (describing practices of seventeen countries); 
WHITE & CASE, NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEWS 2017: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
(2017). 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 112–119. 
15 Id.  
16 Franck Proust, Screening of Foreign Direct Investment in Strategic 
Sectors, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Dec. 14, 2018), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-
progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-screening-of-foreign-
direct-investment-in-strategic-sectors [https://perma.cc/F9KD-WU53]; see 
also European Commission Press Release IP/18/6467, Commission 
Welcomes Agreement on Foreign Investment Screening Framework (Nov. 
20, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6467_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6YPJ-SLTC]; infra text accompanying notes 120–129.  
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This approach, legitimate in the moment, fails to take on 
the crucial long-term concern of assimilating China as a 
normal actor in the global economic system. A cross-border 
M&A regime featuring acquirers with asymmetric motives is 
not stable over the long term. As noted, amendments to the 
CFIUS regime and comparable initiatives at the European 
Union and member-state levels are one response. But the 
national approaches differ in their details, have gaps in 
coverage, and lack follow-up mechanisms to monitor the 
behavior of the acquirer once a deal has been cleared. 
Eventually, the presence of actors in the global M&A market 
with asymmetric motives will lead to a backlash that could 
disrupt global capital markets. Indeed, there are already signs 
of building backlash against China.17 While countries should 
maintain these national-level screening processes, a 
multilateral regime to complement the national-level 
mechanisms would prevent forum shopping by NSBs and 
would enhance the predictability and stability of the cross-
border M&A market. 
The problem of asymmetric motives could be eliminated 
through a multilateral regime of mutual contestability—i.e., a 
requirement that every acquirer in a cross-border deal must 
itself be susceptible to takeover by a foreign buyer. In such a 
regime, value-reducing acquisitions intended to serve 
national strategic objectives could elicit a hostile bid; this 
would serve as a check on such state insistence. Such a regime 
is not politically feasible, however, as demonstrated by the 
collapse of an effort to agree to such a regime at the European 
Union level almost two decades ago.18 
 
17 See, e.g., Jonathan Stearns, Amid China M&A Drive, EU Rushes for 
Investment-Screening Deal, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-04/amid-china-m-a-
drive-eu-rushes-for-investment-screening-deal (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review) (quoting a French member of the European 
Parliament who is leading the body’s deliberations over adoption of an E.U.-
wide screening mechanism, prompted by concerns over China: “It’s the end 
of European naivete . . . . We have to have the courage to change things.”). 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 147–155 (discussing the 
Thirteenth Takeover Directive for the E.U.). 
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This Article sets forth the framework for a second-best 
solution, in which the problem of asymmetric motives can be 
mitigated through adoption of a multilateral regime under 
which firms (whether SOE or POE) subject to the potential for 
direct government influence in their corporate decision-
making must demonstrate “eligibility” to engage in outbound 
M&A. Our proposal contemplates that SOEs, firms subject to 
a golden share held by a governmental body, or POEs with 
governing-party-based internal governance organs would 
commit to an “eligibility regime” before undertaking 
acquisitions of foreign firms. This regime would require a 
commitment to own-firm commercial or financial motives in 
cross-border acquisitions made credible through a corporate 
governance set-up that could verify adherence. We offer an 
outline for such a regime below. The elements are foreign 
ownership of a significant block of shares of the acquirer; 
selection rights lodged with such foreign investors over a 
number of independent directors, who are, in turn, charged 
with responsibility to investigate and certify the absence of 
government influence in the transaction; disclosure of 
financing; and an enforcement apparatus. These specifics are 
offered by way of example—other possible solutions to the 
credible commitment problem are conceivable. 
The regime could be developed through governmental 
agreement, for example, as an add-on to the G20 Guiding 
Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, agreed to in 
2016 during China’s presidency of the G20.19 Alternatively, 
the regime could be developed through a public-private 
consultative process led by the Organisation for Economic Co-
 
19 See Annex III: G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment 
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operation and Development (“OECD”).20 The regime could be 
implemented on an opt-in basis at the national level, for 
example as a new element added to an existing cross-border 
screening regime in lieu of an ever-expanding definition of 
national security. An eligibility regime would provide 
incentives for governments to reduce the number of firms 
subject to such screening and would provide meaningful 
discipline against a state’s efforts to advance national-
strategic motives in cross-border M&A.  
Part II surveys evidence of China’s rise as a serious player 
in the global M&A market. Part III explains the role of China’s 
firms as NSBs and illustrates the way this undermines the 
basic assumption of symmetric private motivations on which 
the global M&A market is based. Part IV examines the 
existing regimes at the national level for dealing with national 
security concerns and the proposals for reforming them. It 
explains why these regimes do not fully address the problem 
of the NSB.  
Part V contains our proposal for a coordinated regime for 
cross-border M&A based on the concept of “eligibility,” which 
would be applied to all firms, regardless of domicile, that are 
subject to potential government influence in their cross-border 
acquisitions. As outlined in detail in Part V, the eligibility 
criteria are designed to make it possible for an acquirer to 
make a credible commitment that its cross-border acquisition 
proposal is motivated by private commercial objectives rather 
 
20 See Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to 
National Security, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (May 25, 2009), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/43384486.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KLN3-5K8K]. The OECD hosts regular Freedom of 
Investment Roundtables that, among other things, led to the 2009 
Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National 
Security, which set forth certain non-binding recommendations on the 
substance as well as review procedures.  
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than national strategic objectives.21 Credibility for the 
commitment to commercial objectives would be provided by a 
corporate governance mechanism featuring public 
certification of the commercial objectives by independent 
directors nominated by the acquirer’s foreign shareholders. 
Part V also outlines an enforcement structure for the 
eligibility regime featuring a secretariat (for example, under 
 
21 This Article proposes that a firm subject to the eligibility regime 
would be eligible to engage in cross-border M&A if it met the following 
requirements:  
(i) the company commits in its charter or other constitutive 
documents to undertake foreign acquisitions solely for own-
firm financial or commercial objectives and not at the behest 
of any government; 
(ii) a significant portion, twenty-five percent, of the 
company’s cash flow rights is available for purchase by 
foreign shareholders; 
(iii) the company’s governance structure provides for 
independent directors, at least twenty-five percent of the 
board (but no fewer than two), who will be nominated by 
foreign shareholders;  
(iv) in advance of a public acquisition proposal, the 
independent directors are required under the acquirer’s 
governance documents to prepare a report for subsequent 
public release that attests to the own-firm financial or 
commercial motivation and absence of government 
involvement in the acquisition decision; and  
(v) the company provides full disclosure of the sources of 
funding for the transaction before the transaction is final.  
Enforcement of the regime would consist of two elements: first, a secretariat 
that can evaluate whether a would-be acquirer satisfies the eligibility 
criteria both as a general matter (the company’s governance set-up) and as 
to the specific transaction; second, national legislation that would permit 
rejection of the acquisition of a local target by an acquirer that does not meet 
the eligibility criteria. 
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the auspices of the OECD) and opt-in legislation at the level 
of the nation states.22  
Part VI anticipates some likely objections to the proposal. 
First, target shareholders are likely to benefit from aggressive 
NSB activity through higher premiums. Second, NSB activity 
may simply fuel more investment in the areas of great interest 
to NSB acquirers. Third, restrictions on cross-border M&A are 
inherently protectionist; countries have the right to choose 
distinctive economic systems. Fourth, China will never go for 
this, so what’s the point?23  
One response is framed in terms of the interest of long-
term participants in global capital markets who will regard 
the explicit or implicit state support behind NSB acquisitions 
as distortionary of the cross-border M&A market. Another 
response looks to the emerging backlash of target-home 
governments that are becoming alarmed at the use of the 
cross-border M&A market to pursue national industrial 
policy. Indeed, this appears to be happening currently in the 
 
22 Our scheme is novel in its effort to use a particular mechanism of 
private ordering—corporate governance—to serve global law-making 
objectives, but not unprecedented in this regard. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision has recently promulgated corporate governance 
guidelines which aim to use board and other corporate governance 
mechanisms to constrain risk-taking by large banks in the name of the 
global objective to maintain financial stability. See KPMG, BASEL 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION – GUIDELINES ON THE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS (2015), https://assets.kpmg/content/ 
dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/05/Corporate-Governance-Principles.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4UPQ-5S7G]. 
23 An objection from a different direction is that our proposal is too 
limited in scope, as it addresses only M&A and not foreign direct investment 
that may have a similar national strategic stimulus. The problems of a 
“national strategic investor” are ultimately less serious than those posed by 
a “national strategic buyer” because of the control rights that are shifted in 
M&A; the influence of a national strategic investor is subject to limitations 
imposed by the target company board and its conduct is more susceptible to 
monitoring by the government where the target is located through such 
measures as the export control regime. However, the eligibility regime 
contemplated by our proposal could be expanded to include strategic 
investments (as defined under the regime) that fall short of a change of 
control. 
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developed world in regard to Chinese investment.24 This 
concern extends beyond a particular acquisition and identifies 
a systemic threat, including the loss of leading technologies to 
the NSB and the NSB-home country, with potentially serious 
ramifications for the target-home country’s long-term 
economic capacity and military capability. In the words of a 
United States Department of Defense report: 
While it is likely that China’s investment in 
technology is driven in part by commercial interests, 
it is unlikely this is the sole reason given China’s 
explicit technology goals. . . . The principal vehicles [to 
enable transfer of technology] are investments in 
early-stage technologies as well as acquisitions. When 
viewed individually, some of these practices may seem 
commonplace and not unlike those employed by other 
countries. However, when viewed in combination, and 
with the resources China is applying, the composite 
picture illustrates the intent, design and dedication of 
a regime focused on technology transfer at a massive 
scale.25  
The “eligibility regime” sustains the relatively open cross-
border M&A regime that helps knit together a global economic 
system, rather than advancing the interests of any particular 
nations. Global M&A is a complement to a global trade 
regime, and together these global regimes serve the long-term 
project of peaceful national economic competition and the 
 
24 See Thilo Hanemann & Daniel H. Rosen, Chinese FDI in the US in 
2017: A Double Policy Punch, RHODIUM GROUP (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://rhg.com/research/chinese-fdi-us-2017-double-policy-punch/ 
[https://perma.cc/UCB6-55K6] (“China epitomizes the ‘countries of special 
concern’ [pending legislation to bolster the U.S. investment screening 
process] is concerned with, and in expanding the types of transactions 
subject to screening, a significant share of the marginal growth in foreign 
investment in the US would be treated with suspicion.”). 
25 MICHAEL BROWN & PAVNEET SINGH, DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT 
EXPERIMENTAL, CHINA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STRATEGY: HOW CHINESE 
INVESTMENTS IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ENABLE A STRATEGIC COMPETITOR 
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spread of economic well-being. These values cannot be 
forgotten as nations struggle with the dislocations and the 
consequence of the global economic system. The “eligibility 
regime” uses tools from the corporate governance toolbox in 
the service of internationalist objectives rather than grander 
international law schema. 
Why would China, or any other regime that imposes on its 
firms an NSB obligation, ever subject itself to such discipline? 
It is unlikely that China’s political leadership would find the 
loss of this lever of influence over the economy attractive. But 
as the national security screening mechanisms in advanced 
western economies proliferate and tighten, it will be in 
China’s national interest to accede to a harmonized M&A 
regime that minimizes the “suspicion tax” under which many 
Chinese firms currently operate in global markets. Moreover, 
at least on a rhetorical level, China’s leadership has expressed 
support for the type of agreed-upon rules-of-the-game 
approach in support of global markets that this Article 
advocates. At the 2017 World Economic Forum in Davos, 
President Xi Jinping called for an open global economy and 
projected himself as a chief statesman on behalf of global 
governance.26 He explained China’s decision to join the WTO 
as reflecting “the conclusion that integration into the global 
economy is a historical trend. To grow its economy, China 
must have the courage to swim in the vast ocean of the global 
market.”27 Support for a multilateral regime that constrains 
mercantilist, national-strategic motivations for deals would 
demonstrate China’s commitment to sound governance of the 
global market for cross-border M&A.  
II. CHINA’S RISE AS A PLAYER IN GLOBAL M&A 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, China has become an 
increasingly important player in cross-border M&A. Over a 
 
26  See Xi Jinping, President, People’s Republic of China, President Xi’s 
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twenty-year period, there has been a steady increase in both 
the annual value of the cross-border transactions entered into 
by Chinese firms and the fraction of worldwide cross-border 
M&A activity that is China-related. This increase has been 
particularly pronounced in the post-global financial crisis 
period, especially from 2015–17. Perhaps more remarkable 
has been the shift in the composition of China-related cross-
border M&A from predominantly inbound earlier in the 
period to predominantly outbound. Measured by value, by the 
time of the financial crisis, the outbound/inbound ratio 
reached 60/40; in recent years, it has been closer to 80/20. 
Measured by number of deals, the outbound/inbound ratio is 











28 Deals, THOMSON REUTERS, https://developers.thomsonreuters. 
com/content/deals-mergers-acquisitions-and-new-issues 
[https://perma.cc/R924-L4Z5] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
29 Id. 
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The starkest comparisons show up when the definition of 
“M&A” is limited to transactions for control, meaning 
acquisitions that result in obtaining an ownership position of 
more than fifty percent of the target’s stock. When control is 
at issue, the data show a pronounced skew towards outbound 
transactions throughout a decade-long period (measured by 
value).30 Inbound acquisitions for control tend to come from 
Hong Kong companies (which may be under the control of 
Chinese owners; the data do not indicate).31 In the case of 
China-related M&A activity involving the United States and 
Europe, Figure 4 shows that inbound transactions for control 
appear to be rare; the direction of deal flow for control 
transactions is overwhelmingly outbound. Chinese firms are 
acquirers in control transactions in the United States and 
Europe, not targets. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that over the 
2015–17 period, most of the outbound acquisition value was 
reflected in transactions in which Chinese acquirers obtained 
more than ninety percent of the target’s stock. 
 
 
30 See infra Figure 4, right-hand column for each year. 
31 See Deals, THOMSON REUTERS, https://developers.thomsonreuters. 
com/content/deals-mergers-acquisitions-and-new-issues 
[https://perma.cc/R924-L4Z5] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
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III. CHINA AS A NATIONAL STRATEGIC BUYER 
As demonstrated in the preceding Part, China’s economic 
rise and growing participation in the global economy have 
introduced a new player in cross-border M&A—the Chinese 
acquirer, which overwhelmingly seeks a dominant, if not one-
hundred-percent, ownership position. Outwardly familiar and 
cloaked in corporate form, the Chinese acquirer has qualities 
that defy conventional categories and make assessment of its 
motives difficult. This is so for several reasons rooted in the 
Chinese political economy. First, SOEs, which have led the 
surge in Chinese outbound acquisitions, have distinctive 
ownership structures and institutionalized linkages to the 
Communist Party that influence their governance in 
unprecedented ways.34 Second, because their corporate 
governance is channeled through Chinese institutions of 
political governance, the SOEs facilitate “policy channeling”—
the use of state-controlled companies (and non-controlling 
private shareholders’ investments) as a means of 
implementing public policy.35 If SOEs were the only Chinese 
firms engaged in cross-border acquisitions, the problem of 
asymmetric motives might find relatively straightforward 
policy solutions.36 But large Chinese private firms are 
increasingly active in cross-border M&A, and they present a 
third conundrum for assessing a Chinese buyer’s motives: the 
conventional dichotomy between state-owned and privately 
 
34 See generally Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) 
Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013). 
35 See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs: 
Tunneling, Propping, and Policy Channeling, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS (Luca Enriques & Tobias Tröeger eds.) 
(forthcoming 2019). 
36 See U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2016 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 507 (Nov. 2016), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
annual_reports/2016%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/77UL-2YED] (recommending a ban on acquisitions of 
United States corporations by Chinese SOEs). 
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owned enterprises is blurred in China.37 Due to heavy state 
intervention in the economy, party penetration of all 
significant organizations in society, and weak institutions to 
check state power, all large firms—whether SOEs, POEs, or 
mixed ownership enterprises—survive and prosper by 
remaining in the good graces of the party-state. Proximity to 
the party-state provides a roadmap of industrial policy goals, 
the pursuit of which generates rents such as subsidies, state-
backed finance, and market protections. As a result, large 
firms in China exhibit substantial similarities in their 
relationship with the state in ways that do not depend on 
equity ownership. These distinctive Chinese corporate traits 
are discussed in turn. 
A. SOE Ownership Structure and Governance38  
More than half of Chinese Fortune Global 500 companies 
are national-level SOEs.39 These SOEs are structured as 
massive business groups whose formation in the 1990s was 
inspired by the apparent success of the Japanese keiretsu and 
South Korean chaebol in propelling economic development in 
those countries.40 The parent (holding) company of an SOE 
business group has only one shareholder: an agency formed 
under the State Council (China’s cabinet) known as the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(“SASAC”), which acts as both an investor on behalf of the 
Chinese people and as a regulatory agency.41 The holding 
company serves as an intermediary between SASAC and the 
other group member firms.42 It coordinates strategy and 
resource allocation within the group, transmits policy 
downward from Chinese regulators to group members, and 
 
37 See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State 
Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 671 (2015). 
38 The account in this Section follows Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 34. 
Readers desiring more detail are directed to that publication.  
39 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 34, at 699.  
40 Id. at 709–15. 
41 Id. at 699–700, 734–45. 
42 Id. at 717. 
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provides information upward from the group to state 
strategists and regulators.43 The global face of a Chinese SOE, 
however, is not the holding company, but one or more of its 
publicly traded subsidiaries.44 While the publicly traded 
subsidiaries have private (non-state) shareholders, ultimate 
control resides with the party-state through SASAC’s indirect 
ownership of a substantial percentage of the publicly traded 
company’s equity,45 along with other unusual governance 
rights discussed below.  
Atop the national SOE business groups is SASAC, the sole 
shareholder of the central SOE holding companies. SASAC 
has a long list of formal functions and responsibilities, 
including preserving and enhancing the value of state-owned 
assets, appointing and removing top SOE executives, setting 
remuneration for SOE personnel and regulating income 
distribution among senior SOE managers, dispatching 
supervisory panels to the SOEs, and drafting regulations on 
the management of state-owned assets.46 
The legal foundation for SASAC’s role in the SOE system 
is the Law of the People’s Republic of China on State-Owned 
Assets of Enterprises (“SOE Asset Law”).47 In essence, the law 
formally recognizes SASAC as an investor—a shareholder in 
the national SOEs, with the rights and duties of a 
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 711. 
45 SASAC is the sole shareholder of ninety-seven parent holding 
companies that in turn control 340 publicly traded subsidiaries. See Jeffrey 
N. Gordon & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Author Calculations Based on Publicly 
Available Information (on file with authors). 
46 See What We Do, STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND 
ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE COUNCIL (July 17, 2018), 
http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2018/07/17/c_7.htm [https://perma.cc/4CPR-NRQ7]. 
47 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Qiye Gouyou Zichan Fa (中华
人民共和国企业国有资产法) [State-owned Enterprise Asset Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, 
effective May 1, 2009). The SOE Asset Law was enacted for the purpose of 
“consolidating and developing the state-owned economy, strengthening the 
protection of state-owned assets, giving play to the leading role of the state-
owned economy in the national economy, and promoting the development of 
the socialist market economy.” Id. at art. 1. 
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shareholder.48 But the law contains some provisions that alter 
the ordinary rights of a shareholder under standard corporate 
law principles. For example, Article 34 requires that SASAC 
obtain government approval before exercising its rights as a 
shareholder with respect to the “merger, splitting, dissolution 
or petition for bankruptcy of an important” SOE under its 
supervision.49 Article 22 gives SASAC the power to appoint 
and remove senior managers in the SOEs under its 
supervision.50  
The corporate ownership structure just outlined, however, 
conveys an incomplete picture of the governance mechanics in 
Chinese SOEs. Equally or more important are the 
mechanisms by which the SOE business groups are linked 
with institutions of the central government and the Chinese 
Communist Party. For example, a number of positions in 
government and party bodies, such as the National People’s 
Congress and the National People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, are reserved for leaders of the national SOEs, and 
senior managers of national SOEs sometimes simultaneously 
hold important positions in the party, the government, or 
industrial associations that perform governmental 
functions.51  
Institutionalized party penetration of the corporate form 
mirrors the party’s parallel governance structures vis-à-vis 
the organs of government. There are two personnel systems in 
all national Chinese SOEs: the regular corporate 
management system and the party system.52 In the corporate 
management system, positions are similar to those found in 
firms elsewhere in the world, including chief executive officer 
(“CEO”), Vice-CEO, chief accountant, and independent board 
members.53 Senior management appointments are made in a 
highly institutionalized arrangement between SASAC and the 
 
48 See id. at arts. 11–14. 
49 See id. at art. 34. 
50 See id. at art. 22. 
51 See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 34, at 727–28. 
52 Id. at 737. 
53 Id. 
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party.54 While appointments power formally resides with 
SASAC, senior appointments are made with input from 
various party organs and ministries regulating relevant 
business operations and are subject to approval by the State 
Council.55 The leadership team in the parallel party system 
includes the secretary of the party committee, several deputy 
secretaries, and a secretary of an anti-corruption office called 
the Discipline Inspection Commission.56 Overlaps between 
the two systems are rather uniform, such that a corporate 
manager of a given rank typically holds a position of 
equivalent rank in the party system.57 The articles of 
association of the SOEs, for example, require the chairman of 
the board to concurrently serve as the secretary of the 
company’s party committee.  
The presence of the party throughout the SOE system is 
concretely manifest in party committees, established within 
SASAC and, pursuant to Chinese Company Law, within each 
SOE group member corporation.58 These committees play 
some corporate roles, such as performing supervisory and 
personnel functions. But they also have political functions, 
such as building allegiance to party principles and 
disseminating campaigns announced by senior government 
leaders. In recent years, high-level government and party 
organs have issued policies seeking to reinforce the party’s 
leadership in SOEs, and the principle of party leadership in 
SOEs has recently been enshrined in the Constitution of the 
 
54 Id. at 737–38. 
55 Id. at 738. 
56 Id. at 737. 
57 Id. 
58 Zhonghua Gonghe Guo Gongsi Fa (中华共和国公司法) [Company Law 
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, revised Dec. 28, 2013, effective Mar. 1, 
2014), art. 19. 
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Chinese Communist Party.59 Guidelines issued by SASAC 
and the Ministry of Finance provide a template for SOEs to 
amend their articles of association so as to weave the principle 
of party leadership into their constitutive documents.60 For 
companies that have adopted the provisions in the template, 
the party committee is now effectively superior to the board of 
directors with respect to material business decisions and 
senior management appointments.61 
Thus, the party, working through SASAC and company-
level party committees, is able to bypass or influence boards 
of directors in the appointment, removal, remuneration, and 
supervision of senior managers, and with respect to major 
business decisions. However, given that senior corporate 
managers simultaneously hold senior party positions within 
the firm, direct conflict between decisions of the party and the 
board is unlikely. Rather, as a consequence of the party’s 
shadow corporate governance rights, the board’s decisions are 
likely to anticipate and dovetail with the interests of the 
party.  
 
59 See, e.g., CONST. OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, Oct. 24, 2017, 
art. 33 (“The leading . . . Party committees of state-owned enterprises shall 
play a leadership role, set the right direction . . . and discuss and decide on 
major issues of their enterprise in accordance with regulations.”) (emphasis 
added); Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China & the State Council, 
Guiding Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China and the State Council on Deepening State-Owned Enterprise Reform, 
LEXIS CHINA, Aug. 24, 2015, at I.2. (“Insist on the leadership of the State-
owned enterprises by the party[.]”). 
60 Angela Huyue Zhang & Zhuang Liu, Ownership and Political 
Control: Evidence from Charter Amendments 7–8 (July 12, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
61 See Houze Song, State-Owned Enterprise Reforms: Untangling 
Ownership, Control, and Corporate Governance, MACROPOLO.ORG (Dec. 4, 
2017), https://macropolo.org/anaysis/state-owned-enterprise-reforms-
untangling-ownership-control-corporate-governance/ 
[https://perma.cc/6LB5-E6J8] (“[D]ecision-makers now favor putting the 
Party committee atop the board as the ultimate authority in an SOE.”). 
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1. Policy Channeling  
 In firms with dispersed, diversified shareholders, 
shareholder wealth is affected by corporate decisions only 
through their impact on stock price. As a result, shareholders 
will agree about the corporation’s objective function: it should 
act to increase the value of the corporation’s stock. But this 
separation theorem does not hold in a variety of contexts, 
including where the government acts as the controlling 
shareholder of an SOE with public (non-state) minority 
shareholders. In this case, while shareholder value 
maximization is the goal of the non-state shareholders, the 
state may use the corporation (effectively or otherwise) to 
serve public policy objectives—a strategy one of us in previous 
work has called “policy channeling.”62 These objectives might 
include maintaining employment, pursuing industrial policy 
goals, or securing state control over the commanding heights 
of the economy. States may engage in policy channeling 
because it is perceived as a lower-cost substitute for regulation 
in weak institutional environments,63 for ideological reasons, 
or because the SOE insulates government action and 
distributive decisions from public scrutiny and participation. 
Policy channeling can of course be found outside China—it 
is one of the principal theoretical explanations for state 
ownership of business enterprise everywhere. But the 
governance characteristics of Chinese SOEs described above 
make them unusually powerful instruments of policy 
channeling. Thorough party penetration of the SOEs’ 
corporate governance structures suggests that the goal of this 
massive network of firms is to maximize social rather than 
shareholder welfare. Or to put it differently, China’s leaders 
 
62 Milhaupt & Pargendler, supra note 35, at 1. 
63 See id. For an analysis of Chinese SOEs as an efficient response to 
high regulatory costs in a weak institutional environment, see generally Si 
Zeng, State Ownership as a Substitute for Costly Regulation: A Law and 
Economic Analysis of State-Owned Enterprises in China (Feb. 14, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2916985 [https://perma.cc/8BV3-VXMT]. 
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view the SOEs as a means of maximizing welfare at the 
country, rather than the corporate, level.  
2. Blurred SOE-POE Dichotomy  
 The impact of China’s political economy on corporate 
governance and objectives extends well beyond SOEs, 
rendering distinctions among firms based on ownership 
misleading.64 The boundary between public and private 
enterprise has long been blurred in China, a country with a 
tradition of state intervention in the economy, inchoate 
notions of property rights, and a history of economic reform 
strategies relying heavily on mixed (state and private) 
ownership of the means of production.65 State-generated rents 
are distributed not only to SOEs, but also to POEs perceived 
to be furthering state objectives. The human agents managing 
SOEs and POEs in China respond in similar fashion to the 
institutional environment: fostering close personal ties to 
government and party organs, seeking state largesse, and 
remaining in the good graces of political leaders are important 
to the success of all firms in China. One indication of the 
gravitational pull of the party-state in the corporate realm is 
widespread membership in government and party organs by 
the founders of large POEs, in the same way that high-level 
SOE executives are affiliated with these organs.66 Thus, 
functionally, SOEs and large POEs “share many similarities 
in the areas commonly thought to distinguish state-owned 
firms from privately owned firms: market access, receipt of 
state subsidies, proximity to state power, and execution of the 
 
64 See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 37, at 669. 
65 See id. at 671. 
66 See id. at 684 (finding that ninety-five out of one hundred founders 
or chief executives of the largest POEs in China are, or formerly were, 
members of party and government organs; same for eight of the top ten 
largest Chinese internet-based firms). Access to the finance necessary to 
accomplish cross-border M&A is strongly influenced by political connections 
of the POE principals. See Denis Schweizer, Thomas Walker & Aoran 
Zhang., Cross-Border Acquisitions by Chinese Enterprises: The Benefits and 
Disadvantages of Political Connections, J. CORP. FIN. (forthcoming 2019). 
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government’s policy objectives.”67 The identity of a Chinese 
firm’s equity owners thus provides relatively little 
information about the degree of autonomy the firm enjoys 
from the state.  
Nevertheless, as Chinese cross-border M&A activity has 
ratcheted up, the composition of Chinese acquirers has shifted 
from SOEs to POEs.68 SOE acquisitions attract heightened 
scrutiny under existing regulatory regimes. For POEs, the 
government connections and support are not as obvious and 
thus POE transactions are less likely to be challenged. 
Schweizer et al. report a pronouncement to this effect by a 
member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference: 
Given the fact that SOEs often experience setbacks 
when acquiring foreign companies in advanced 
economies, POEs are encouraged to acquire the high 
technology for the growth of China’s economy. 
Because POEs rarely have Chinese government 
background, they can avoid the scrutiny from foreign 
governments targeting Chinese SOEs. The 
government should provide financing to POEs for 
their cross-border deals and even state-owned 
companies could provide funding in the background to 
POEs.69 
The shift from SOEs to POEs is reflected in the data. 
Figure 6 shows that the number of POE cross-border 
acquisitions now far outstrips SOE acquisitions. Figure 7 
shows that, by value, POE acquisitions have become 
increasingly important but that SOEs undertake significant 
acquisitions as well.  
 
 
67 Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 37, at 668. 
68 See infra Figure 6. 
69 Schweizer et al., supra note 66, at 2 (quoting Zhang Hongwei 
(CPPCC) Suggests to Diversify the Methods of Overseas Investment on 
Energy, SINA (Mar. 8, 2010), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-03-
08/120919815889.shtml (in Chinese) [https://perma.cc/75QD-CJ9P]). 
  






70 Deals, THOMSON REUTERS, https://developers.thomsonreuters. 
com/content/deals-mergers-acquisitions-and-new-issues 
[https://perma.cc/R924-L4Z5] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
71 Id. 
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3. Summary  
 Large Chinese corporations have a number of highly 
distinctive traits resulting from China’s political and 
economic systems. This Article highlights these traits not to 
pass judgment on Chinese economic governance structures, 
but to underscore that the multilateral trade and investment 
regimes that took shape in the post-war period simply do not 
contemplate this type of actor.72 It is thus not surprising that 
the emergence of Chinese firms as major participants in the 
global economy has generated anxiety in the countries where 
these firms are active. To quote from a prior work: 
Suspicions about foreign investments by Chinese 
firms, regardless of ownership, are likely to remain as 
long as the state retains equity interests in ostensibly 
private enterprises; the government routinely 
provides subsidies and privileged market access to 
state-linked firms; and it is common practice for senior 
executives at major firms, SOE or POE, to be affiliated 
with the party-state in various capacities. In short, 
suspicions about foreign investments by Chinese firms 
will linger as long as the institutional foundations of 
Chinese state capitalism remain intact.73 
B. Illustration: Made in China 2025  
Made in China 2025 (“MIC 2025”), issued by the State 
Council in May 2015, is the Chinese government’s policy 
response to challenges facing the country’s domestic 
manufacturing industry.74 While China’s manufacturing 
 
72 See generally Mark Wu, The WTO and China’s Unique Economic 
Structure, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND? THE INSTITUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 313 (Benjamin L. Liebman & 
Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2016). 
73 Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 37, at 707. 
74 The first official appearance of “Made in China 2025” was the 2015 
government report by Prime Minister Li Keqiang. Li Keqiang, Zhengfu 
Gongzuo Baogao (政府工作报告) [Government Work Report], CENTRAL 
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industry is huge, it has not produced a large number of 
indigenously developed, globally competitive products and 
still depends heavily on core technologies developed by foreign 
companies. MIC 2025 identifies ten priority sectors 
accounting for forty percent of China’s value-added 
manufacturing, including next-generation information 
technology, aviation, new materials, and biosciences.75 It sets 
domestic market share targets for various products, such as 
new energy vehicles, mobile phone chips, and wide-body 
aircraft, as well as targets for innovation, quality, digitization, 
and green development.76 Among the policy tools actually or 
allegedly being used by the Chinese central and local 
governments to implement MIC 2025 are forced technology 
transfers in exchange for market access, government-backed 
investment funds, and acquisition of foreign technology 
through outbound investment.77  
Evidence of state-led investment tied to MIC 2025 
priorities is most evident in the information technology 
industry, where outbound Chinese investments in the 
semiconductor industry skyrocketed in 2014 and 2015 after 
the Chinese central government promulgated guidelines on 
 
75 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MADE IN CHINA 2025: GLOBAL 
AMBITIONS BUILT ON LOCAL PROTECTIONS 6, 10 (2017), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/final_made_in_china_2025_
report_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VJC-W23G]. 
76 See id. at 65–80; see also id. at 6 (noting that MIC 2025 “appears to 
provide preferential access to capital to domestic companies in order to 
promote their indigenous research and development capabilities, support 
their ability to acquire technology from abroad, and enhance their overall 
competitiveness . . . MIC 2025 constitutes a broader strategy to use state 
resources to alter and create comparative advantage in these sectors on a 
global scale.”). 
77 See EUROPEAN UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA, CHINA 
MANUFACTURING 2025: PUTTING INDUSTRIAL POLICY AHEAD OF MARKET 
FORCES 15–16 (2017), http://docs.dpaq.de/12007-european_chamber 
_cm2025-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PG2-WKR9]. 
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promotion of the national integrated circuit industry.78 The 
Rhodium Group, a private firm that gathers data on Chinese 
investment in the United States, concluded that 
semiconductors are “the clearest example yet of the nexus 
between strategic high-tech policy and outbound investment 
in today’s China.”79 
As the semi-conductor example suggests, given the 
political economy context in which Chinese firms operate, 
MIC 2025 is more than a simple statement of government 
policy. It is a roadmap for Chinese firms in their pursuit of 
profitable investments. In the words of a European Union 
Chamber of Commerce in China report, 
[T]he priorities and targets that the [MIC 2025] 
outlines will have sent a strong message to provincial 
and local governments, SOEs and private Chinese 
companies regarding the central government’s 
priorities. This will have given them a clear idea of 
where subsidies, other forms of support, and therefore 
near-term opportunities for profit, can be expected to 
flow.80 
The report notes a surge in Chinese investment into 
European firms in the wake of MIC 2025’s publication, 
quoting a State Council directive that “SOEs should be 
encouraged to carry out acquisitions and mergers with a focus 
on developing strategies and a goal for attaining key 
technologies and core resources.”81 The report asks whether 
MIC 2025 “amount[s] to a shopping list of technologies that 
the country has not been able to develop at home” and 
concludes,  
 
78 See THILO HANEMANN & DANIEL H. ROSEN, RHODIUM GRP., CHINESE 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: RECENT TRENDS AND THE POLICY AGENDA 
77–78 (2016) https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Chinese_ 
Investment_in_the_United_States_Rhodium.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA35-
J2AQ]. 
79 Id. at 81. 
80 EUROPEAN UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA, supra note 77, at 
13. 
81 Id. at 19. 
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While it is perfectly standard for private business to 
make strategic acquisitions, their decisions should 
ultimately be informed by the profit motive. 
Investments made by firms in response to their 
government’s industrial policies or strategic interests 
may be completely at odds with the interests of the 
country into which the investment is made.82  
A United States Chamber of Commerce report expresses 
similar sentiments, citing global concerns that outbound 
Chinese investments tied to industrial policy result in the 
acquisition of foreign technology.83 
The European Union and United States Chamber of 
Commerce reports might be discounted as scaremongering by 
China’s global competitors. Some of the reports’ language is 
reminiscent of fears expressed about Japanese industrial 
policy in the 1980s, which turned out to be unfounded. But 
several considerations suggest that the concerns raised by 
these bodies should be taken seriously. First, at a conceptual 
level, it is not unreasonable to think that cross-border M&A 
could be a vehicle for advancing the power of a state actor, 
particularly an authoritarian regime with lofty global 
ambitions. Second, government policy does, in fact, influence 
outbound deal flow and acquisition targets. A steep decline in 
Chinese foreign direct investment (“FDI”) into the United 
States in 2017 was caused by Beijing’s clampdown on capital 
outflows in order to stem a decline in foreign exchange 
reserves as well as its limiting of overseas deal-making by 
large private firms, in an effort to reduce leverage in the 
financial sector.84 Third, Chinese press reports indicate that 
most of the cross-border deals are not profitable for the 
companies that enter into them,85 suggesting that their 
 
82 Id. 
83 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 75, at 23–24. 
84 See Hanemann & Rosen, supra note 24. 
85 Schweizer et al., supra note 66, at 3 (citing The Cross-Border M&A 
of Chinese Companies Have Been Experiencing Exponential Growth, but 
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impetus comes from government direction with the implicit 
promise of government financial support. Fourth, 
independent analysts echo the concerns voiced in the 
European Union and United States Chamber of Commerce 
reports.86 Fifth, the reaction of governments around the world 
to Chinese outbound investment indicates that the concerns 
expressed in these reports are widely shared by lawmakers 
and policymakers, and that a backlash is building due to the 
perception that China is using a liberal regime for national 
gain. It is to the policy reactions around the world that this 
Article now turns. 
IV. EXISTING REGIMES AND PROPOSALS FOR 
REFORM 
A. The United States 
Concerns that foreign investors may pose a threat to host 
countries are of course not new. The United States has had a 
regime to examine the national security implications of 
foreign direct investment since 1975. This regime, centered in 
CFIUS, was created by executive order providing that CFIUS 
would have the “primary continuing responsibility within the 
Executive Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign 
investment in the United States, both direct and portfolio, and 
for coordinating the implementation of United States policy 
on such investment.”87 CFIUS is an interagency committee 
chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and comprised of the 
heads of numerous executive branch agencies, including the 
 
86 See, e.g., Evaluating CFIUS: Challenges Posed by a Changing Global 
Economy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Policy & Trade of the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 2–6 (2018) (statement of Scott 
Kennedy, Center for Strategic and International Studies); id. (statement of 
Derek Scissors, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute). 
87 Exec. Order No. 11,858 § 1(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975). 
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Departments of State, Commerce, Justice, Defense, and 
Homeland Security.88  
In 1988, amidst concerns over Japanese acquisitions of 
United States firms, Congress approved the Exon-Florio 
amendment to the Defense Production Act, granting the 
president authority to block mergers and acquisitions that 
threaten national security.89 The Exon-Florio amendment 
provides a statutory basis for the national security screening 
process undertaken by CFIUS. By executive order, President 
Reagan delegated his authority to administer the Exon-Florio 
provision to CFIUS. As a result, 
CFIUS was transformed from an administrative body 
with limited authority to review and analyze data on 
foreign investment to an important component of U.S. 
foreign investment policy with a broad mandate and 
significant authority to advise the President on 
foreign investment transactions and to recommend 
that some transactions be suspended or blocked.90 
Until the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act (“FIRRMA”) in August 2018, discussed 
infra, the CFIUS regime was governed by the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”), 
implemented by executive order in 2008.91 FINSA codified 
CFIUS itself,92 along with various elements of the CFIUS 
process that had emerged since the Exon-Florio amendment, 
and strengthened CFIUS in various ways, such as broadening 
 
88 Composition of CFIUS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-
investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx [https://perma.cc/AL6A-PZFJ] (last 
updated Dec. 1, 2010). 
89 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425–26 (1988). 
90 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE 
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 6 
(2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33388 
[https://perma.cc/465G-KLD8]. 
91 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-49, § 3, 121 Stat. 246, 252 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565 
(2012)); Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4,677 (Jan. 25, 2008).  
92 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 3. 
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the definition of national security to include threats to 
homeland security and “critical infrastructure.”93 By law, 
CFIUS is required to review all “covered” foreign investment 
transactions.94 A covered transaction is defined as a “merger, 
acquisition, or takeover . . . by or with any foreign person 
which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in 
interstate commerce in the United States.”95 CFIUS must also 
review any transaction that could result in control by a 
“foreign government-controlled” entity.96 
Under FINSA, the CFIUS review process was comprised of 
three stages. The first stage was a thirty-day national security 
review to determine whether the investment threatened to 
impair national security, critical infrastructure, homeland 
security, or was state-backed or controlled.97 If no risks were 
found or such risks were resolved, no further action was 
necessary and the transaction was granted a safe harbor.98 If 
risks were not resolved or if a foreign state controlled the 
acquirer, review moved to the second stage, a national 
security investigation of up to forty-five days.99 During this 
period, CFIUS could impose conditions, develop interim 
protections, or negotiate mitigation agreements.100 If 
outstanding concerns were not resolved, CFIUS could send a 
negative recommendation to the President. The President had 
fifteen days to make a determination.101 At any time during 
 
93 Id. § 2(a)(5). 
94 Id. § 2(b)(1)(A). 
95 Id. § 2(a)(3). Purchases by a foreign person of ten percent or less of 
the voting securities of a United States business solely for purposes of 
passive investment are not “covered” transactions. Treas. Reg. § 800.302(b) 
(2008). 
96 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 2(b)(1)(B); 
see also id. § (2)(a)(4). 
97 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1) (2012). 
98 See, e.g., LATHAM & WATKINS, OVERVIEW OF THE CFIUS PROCESS 
(2017), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/overview-CFIUS-process, 
[https://perma.cc/94GT-ZSGR]; MARIO MANCUSO, A DEALMAKER’S GUIDE TO 
CFIUS (2017).  
99 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(2)(C) (2012). 
100 JACKSON, supra note 90, at 13. 
101 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(2) (2012). 
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this process, parties could withdraw and, if desired, re-file 
their notice. Prior to these formal stages, CFIUS often 
engaged in an informal pre-filing review of proposed 
transactions to identify potential issues.102 Informal review 
could benefit foreign acquirers, for example, by allowing them 
to avoid negative publicity stemming from having a proposed 
transaction blocked.103  
Historically, very few transactions have been blocked 
under the CFIUS process,104 but the pace of blocked or 
abandoned deals appears to be on the rise. Only two 
transactions were blocked from the inception of CFIUS 
through 2012.105 One reason for the low number of negative 
Presidential determinations is that foreign acquirers may 
withdraw their filing—particularly if the process moves from 
the first (review) stage to the second (investigatory) stage—in 
order to avoid potential negative consequences from having a 
transaction blocked.106 However, three transactions involving 
Chinese acquirers have been blocked in the past two years, 
and one was abandoned.107 The proposed acquisition of 
 
102 JACKSON, supra note 90, at 11. 
103 Id. at 11–12. 
104 Nevertheless, FINSA’s formalization of the review process has 
imposed costs on shareholders of potential United States targets of cross-
border M&A. See David Godsell, Ugur Lel & Darius Miller, Financial 
Protectionism, M&A Activity, and Shareholder Wealth (SMU Cox School of 
Business Research Paper No. 18-23, 2019), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3147404 [https://perma.cc/5SW7-FDWM] (finding significant 
decline in foreign takeovers of firms more likely to attract CFIUS scrutiny 
and negative shareholder returns of 4.2% of such firms, relative to a control 
group, upon adoption of FINSA). 
105 See MANCUSO, supra note 98, at 4, 54. 
106 Id. at 21–22 (reporting that in the 2008–15 period, four percent of 
transactions notified to CFIUS were withdrawn during the initial thirty-
day review period and six percent were withdrawn during an investigation). 
107 The blocked transactions are: Fujian Grand Chip Investment 
Fund’s proposed acquisition of Axtron, a German semiconductor firm with 
assets in the United States; Lattice Semiconductor’s acquisition by Canyon 
Bridge Capital Partners, a Silicon Valley-based venture capital firm with 
funding from the Chinese government; and Ant Financial’s proposed 
acquisition of MoneyGram. Huawei abandoned plans to partner with AT&T 
to sell smartphones in the United States. 
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Qualcomm, a leading United States developer of 5G 
technology, by Broadcom, a company in the process of 
transitioning from a Singapore domicile to Delaware, was 
blocked in 2018 on the grounds that “a weakening of 
Qualcomm’s position [as a result of its acquisition by a foreign 
buyer taking a “private equity-style” approach to reducing 
R&D in favor of short-term profitability] would leave an 
opening for China to expand its influence on the 5G standard-
setting process.”108 Given the level of concern in Washington 
about Chinese direct investment and that China was the 
home country of the acquirer in more CFIUS-covered 
transactions than any other country in the period from 2013 
to 2015 (the most recent years for which data are available),109 
the rarity of negative presidential determinations may be a 
thing of the past. Alternatively, the negative climate could 
have a chilling effect on Chinese investment proposals so that 
outright rejections may remain infrequent.  
Over time, a consensus emerged in the United States 
government and policy communities that the CFIUS process 
 
108 Letter from Aimen N. Mir, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Inv. Sec., to 
Mark Plotkin, Covington & Burling L.L.P., & Theodore Kassinger, 
O’Melveny & Myers L.L.P. 2–3 (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/804328/000110465918015036/a18-7296_7ex99d1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H6QM-QDHT]. 
109 COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
REPORT PERIOD CY 2015, at 16–17 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/ 
resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/Unclassified 
%20CFIUS%20Annual%20Report%20-%20(report%20period%20CY 
%202015).pdf [https://perma.cc/K975-BHXW]. The unclassified version of 
the annual report is released with a two-year lag. 
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was outdated and inadequate under the FINSA regime.110 
Chinese investments were the catalyst for these concerns, 
both because of the rapid increase of such investments into 
the United States and suspicions that some Chinese 
investments had been structured to circumvent CFIUS 
review. This situation not only posed potential threats to 
national security, but it also introduced a new level of 
regulatory uncertainty for deal planners. A January 2018 law 
firm memo to clients summed up these sentiments as follows: 
The CFIUS process is under significant pressure. The 
Committee’s caseload is larger than it can reasonably 
handle with existing resources; the government 
doubts its own ability to monitor rapid technological 
changes that could present threats to national 
security; and the fastest growing source of technology 
investment — China — is becoming the United States’ 
strongest technology competitor but lacks the shared 
security alliances enjoyed by other countries. In that 
setting, businesses’ ability to assess, accommodate 
and respond to CFIUS risk has become even more 
tenuous than in the past.111 
 
110 One analysis by a prominent think tank concluded that “[t]he 
CFIUS process is working” but warned that “emerging trends bear close 
monitoring as they could—over time—reduce the effectiveness of the 
[current CFIUS] system. Specifically, these include the increasing 
complexity of transactions, the growing role of foreign government-owned 
or controlled entities in mergers and acquisitions, [and] the growing number 
of cases filed with CFIUS[.]” ANDREW HUNTER & JOHN SCHAUS, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, CSIS REVIEW OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 11–12 (2016), https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161207_Hunter_CFIUS_ 
Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L25-86B8]. 
111 Trends and Updates in the CFIUS Space, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL 
LLP 5 (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.davispolk.com/files/2018-01-
16_trends_updates_in_the_cfius_space.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XKS-NP65]. 
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In response to these concerns, FIRRMA was introduced in 
Congress in 2017 and enacted in August 2018.112 The 
legislation, which will require detailed rulemaking by the 
Treasury Department in order to be fully operational, has 
several key features. First, it expands the scope of 
transactions CFIUS may consider to include non-passive but 
non-controlling investments in United States businesses 
involving sensitive personal data, critical infrastructure, or 
critical technology, as well as certain real estate 
transactions.113 Second, it changes the timeline for CFIUS 
review by adding fifteen days to the initial review period and 
permits the Secretary of the Treasury to add fifteen days at 
the back end of an investigation in “extraordinary 
circumstances.”114 Third, it creates a dual-track filing system: 
abbreviated notices of transactions that pose low national 
security risk, and mandatory filings for certain transactions 
in which foreign governments have a “substantial interest.”115 
CFIUS is permitted to establish other categories of mandatory 
filings for acquisitions involving “critical technologies.”116 
Fourth, and in the spirit of the proposal advanced in this 
Article, FIRRMA permits the Treasury Department to share 
information with foreign allied governments and requires 
CFIUS to establish a formal process for doing so.117 Proposals 
for more fundamental changes, such as allowing CFIUS to 
consider the broader economic effects of a proposed 
investment as part of its review process,118 or requiring 
 
112 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, S. 
2098, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R. 4311, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); 
Subtitle A of Title XVII of Pub. L. 115-232 (Aug. 13, 2018). See generally E. 
Maddy Berg, Note, A Tale of Two Statutes: Using IEEPA’s Accountability 
Safeguards to Inspire CFIUS Reform, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1763 (2018). 
113 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 § 1703. 
114 Id. § 1709. 
115 See id. § 1706. 
116 Id. § 1703(a)(4)(B)(iii)(II). The Treasury Department has adopted a 
pilot program to review certain transactions involving foreign persons and 
critical technologies. See 31 C.F.R. § 801 (2018). 
117 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 § 1713. 
118 See United States Foreign Investment Review Act of 2017, S. 1983, 
115th Cong. (2017). 
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CFIUS to consider whether the home country of the acquirer 
offers reciprocity to foreign investors,119 were not enacted as 
part of FIRRMA. 
B. The European Union and Member States 
Currently, the European Union is in the midst of 
fashioning an E.U.-level process that would give the European 
Commission (the “Commission”) the responsibility of vetting, 
on national security grounds, cross-border transactions of 
“Union interest,” yet would leave the final decision to the 
member state that is geographically connected to the 
transaction.120 This new regulation comes against the 
backdrop of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”), which prohibits restrictions on the 
movement of capital between member states and between 
member states and “third countries,” except where necessary 
to achieve certain defined objectives, including public 
security.121 E.U.-level investment constraints have previously 
been addressed to competition concerns, with restrictions 
imposed only through exercise of the Commission’s authority 
to review and block transactions on antitrust grounds.122 
This European Union initiative responds to calls for 
creation of a CFIUS-like process at the E.U.-level in light of 
growing concerns about Chinese investment—specifically, 
that China has gained access to key technologies in Europe 
 
119 See True Reciprocity Investment Act of 2017, S. 1722, 115th Cong. 
(2017). 
120 Proust, supra note 16; see also European Commission Press Release, 
supra note 16. 
121 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union art. 63, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 71 (allowing for 
free movement of capital); id. at art. 65 Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 72–
73 (providing public policy and public security justification for restrictions 
on capital movements). 
122 See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document White Paper, 
Towards More Effective EU Merger Control, at 18–22, SWD (2014) 221 final 
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while shielding its own companies from foreign takeovers 
through its own regulatory regime.123 On September 13, 2017, 
the European Union set out a draft regulation proposing a 
framework for screening foreign investments on the grounds 
of “security or public order.”124 Like FIRRMA’s expansion of 
“covered” transactions to include non-passive but non-
controlling acquisitions, the European Union proposal 
includes an encompassing definition of foreign direct 
investment, as deals involving a “foreign investor aiming to 
establish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the 
foreign investor and the entrepreneur . . . including 
investments which enable effective participation in the 
management or control[.]”125 The European Parliament, the 
European Council, and the Commission reached agreement on 
the proposed screening framework in November 2018126 and 
anticipate approval of a final text in early 2019.  
If adopted in its current form, the regulation would 
empower the Commission to undertake review of any foreign 
investment in an economic enterprise in a member state 
where it “considers that a foreign direct investment is likely 
to affect projects or programmes of [European] Union interest 
on grounds of security or public order.”127 However, the 
proposed regulation provides that while a member state is 
required to take “utmost account” of the Commission’s 
opinion, it need only “provide an explanation to the 
 
123 See Gisela Grieger, Foreign Direct Investment Screening: A Debate 
in Light of China-EU FDI Flows, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 1, 4–5 (May 2017), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/603941/EPRS_
BRI(2017)603941_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AK5-56Q4]; David K. 
Lakhdhir & Anna L. Christie, Paul Weiss Discusses Screening of Foreign 
Investments in EU, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 6, 2017), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/10/06/paul-weiss-discusses-
screening-of-foreign-investments-in-eu/ [https://perma.cc/XQ3V-SQHM]. 
124 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Establishing a Framework for Screening of Foreign Direct 
Investments into the European Union, art. 1, COM (2017) 487 final (Sept. 
13, 2017) [hereinafter Proposal for Screening]. 
125 Id. at art. 2. 
126 See European Commission Press Release, supra note 16. 
127 Proposal for Screening, supra note 124, at art. 9.  
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Commission in case its opinion is not followed.”128 The 
proposal would not require member states to adopt a 
screening mechanism for foreign investments; rather, it would 
create an enabling framework and a set of basic principles for 
member states that seek to establish such a mechanism. In 
addition, the proposal would create a cooperation mechanism 
whereby member states undertaking a review of a transaction 
would be required to notify the Commission and the other 
member states of such a review within five working days of its 
initiation.129 
Some individual European Union member states have 
already implemented their own national security screening 
mechanisms, among them Germany, France, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom.130 These regimes vary in form and 
stringency.131 The French regime allows the government to 
block foreign takeovers of French companies in strategic 
industries.132 A 2014 decree expanded the list of sectors in 
which foreign investors must seek prior French government 
authorization to include energy, transportation, and telecom, 
among others, and extended the list of circumstances in which 
a transaction may be blocked.133 Germany, which already 
permitted review of foreign takeovers for public order and 
security concerns, enhanced its regime in 2017.134 Through 
the reform, Germany became the first European Union 
member state to specifically screen transactions that threaten 
critical infrastructure. The reform also increased notification 
 
128 Id.  
129 Id. at art. 8. 
130 See Gisela Grieger, supra note 123, at 6 tbl.1 (showing security-
related screening procedures for FDI at various member states); Wehrlé & 
Pohl, supra note 13, annex 1 (describing screening practices for seventeen 
countries, including Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom).  
131 See Wehrlé & Pohl, supra note 13, annex 1. China also has a 
screening regime for foreign investment, featuring a “negative list” of off-
limits sectors and provisions defining national security in extremely broad 
terms. Id.  
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requirements and extended review periods.135 The United 
Kingdom’s review process has historically been more limited, 
although national security has been invoked seven times to 
permit the government to intervene in foreign investments.136 
In March 2018, the United Kingdom government lowered the 
threshold for its review of mergers that raise national security 
concerns, broadening its review to include “dual use” military 
items, computer hardware, and quantum technology.137 This 
action is the first step to emerge from a consultative process 
launched in October 2017, which had raised the possibility of 
a mandatory notification regime, under which any foreign 
investor in any one of several specified sectors would need to 
obtain United Kingdom government approval before a 
transaction would receive legal effect.138  
C. Evaluation 
Enhancing the existing national regimes in the ways 
recently done in the United States and currently under 
consideration elsewhere is sound policy. On balance and 
subject to a variety of concerns ranging from lack of 
transparency to under-inclusiveness, the CFIUS process 
appears to have worked reasonably well in striking a balance 
between maintaining openness to foreign investment while 
screening out transactions that pose a risk to national 
security. Broadening the scope of CFIUS review, mandating 
review of certain transactions, and fostering information 
sharing with other governments are sensible ways to enhance 
the regime’s functional efficacy.  
However, these reforms do not adequately address the 
threats posed to the global cross-border M&A regime by a 




137 See DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, ENTERPRISE ACT 
2002: CHANGES TO THE TURNOVER AND SHARE OF SUPPLY TESTS FOR MERGERS 
5, 13 (Jun. 2018) (UK). 
138 See DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, NATIONAL SECURITY 
AND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT REVIEW 7, 47 (Oct. 2017) (UK). 
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global response to concerns about the NSB has to date been 
national in scope, and the intensity and contours of the review 
processes vary significantly by country. The fact that many of 
the existing national regimes are currently being re-examined 
for possible enhancement suggests the weakness of the 
current approaches in the face of China’s emergence as a 
distinctive type of acquisitive actor in global M&A. The 
pending European Union proposal, if adopted, would 
constitute the first multi-country, coordinated approach to 
national security screening. But as noted, it would not require 
the creation of a uniform screening process at the member-
state level, and the Commission’s opinions as to specific 
transactions would not be binding on member states. 
Moreover, recent developments suggest inherent 
limitations in the use of national security screening 
mechanisms in response to concerns about the motives of 
Chinese acquirers. For example, the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) voted in February of 2018 
to block a proposed acquisition of the Chicago Stock Exchange 
by a Chinese acquirer, even though the deal had been cleared 
by CFIUS in 2016.139 According to media reports, the SEC 
rejected the deal because it “left too many unanswered 
questions about who would ultimately have control over big 
decisions at the exchange.”140 The SEC indicated that it did 
not consider the national security implications of the deal or 
possible links between the buyer and the Chinese 
government, because the proposed structure itself was 
problematic.141 A second recent illustration of the limitations 
of the CFIUS process is the Chinese government’s takeover of 
Anbang Insurance Group (“Anbang”). Anbang is a private 
company that engaged in a debt-fueled spate of overseas 
acquisitions in recent years, including the purchase of the 
 
139 Emily Flitter, S.E.C. Blocks Chinese Takeover of Chicago Stock 
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Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York.142 The Chinese 
government, increasingly concerned about the amount of debt 
being amassed in the corporate sector, took over Anbang in 
February 2018.143 The case raises an additional risk 
associated with overseas Chinese acquisitions: that a 
domestic target acquired by a private Chinese buyer in a 
transaction cleared by CFIUS or another country’s national 
security screening regime may ultimately wind up under the 
control of the Chinese government.144 
Similarly, the rejection of the Broadcom-Qualcomm 
transaction,145 shows the distortion that may emerge in the 
effort to package all concerns about the strategic objectives of 
state-guided foreign actors in a national security box. In 
stating CFIUS’s national security reasons for rejecting the 
proposed acquisition (which had no direct link to China), the 
United States Treasury was essentially forced to declare a 
national industrial policy of developing a 5G 
telecommunications network and a national corporate 
governance policy of disfavoring a debt-financed acquisition 
relative to a stock-for-stock deal because of the possible effect 
on long-term investment.146 In other words, China’s shadow 
as an NSB loomed over a deal that involved no Chinese 
participants, causing a contortion of the CFIUS process. In 
most cases, the governmental concern will be that an 
acquisition by an NSB will be in service of a foreign state’s 
objectives, which may be hard to decipher: Is the state 
pursuing mercantilist goals for competitive advancement of 
NSB-home country firms? Or is there a geo-strategic motive 
in play? These types of concerns are sources of instability in a 
cross-border regime that features NSBs.  
 
142 Alexandra Stevenson, After Anbang Takeover, China’s Deal Money, 




144 See id. 
145 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
146 See Mir, supra note 108. 
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As noted in Part I, there is a contrast between 
international trade and cross-border M&A. International 
trade is governed, imperfectly to be sure, by a multilateral 
regime of standard setting and dispute resolution. By 
contrast, cross-border M&A—another important source of 
global economic activity, equally, if not more sensitive to 
national interests than international trade—is regulated 
almost exclusively at the national level.147 A global economic 
regime facing a problem of global dimensions calls for a global 
solution. We are not naïve about the prospects for a global 
regime of reciprocity in cross-border M&A. As described 
below, the failure of the Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers in 
the European Union demonstrates the difficulty of crafting a 
truly comprehensive approach. Rather, in the Part that 
follows, we propose an alternative solution to the problem of 
the NSB. Building on an existing set of principles on 
investment policy agreed to by the G20 in 2016, we outline a 
limited, but coordinated approach to cross-border M&A that 
would mitigate concerns over asymmetric motives. 
V. TOWARD A MULTILATERAL REGIME FOR 
CROSS-BORDER M&A 
Part V begins by acknowledging the challenges in 
constructing any multilateral regime that would constrain 
states’ efforts to use cross-border M&A for strategic purposes. 
A first-best solution would be a regime that was self-enforcing, 
in which the actors’ internalized motives would constrain 
efforts by states to push for state-focused strategic objectives. 
One straightforward approach is an eligibility regime of 
“mutual contestability” under which a firm would be eligible 
to undertake an acquisition of a foreign target only if the 
would-be acquirer were itself susceptible to takeover by a 
bidder domiciled outside its home country. Over time, a 
regime of mutual contestability could be expected to eliminate 
 
147 Almost, but not entirely, exclusively because the E.U. Takeover 
Directive does attempt to coordinate basic principles for the regulation of 
M&A among member states. But the Takeover Directive is a pale reflection 
of a truly coordinated multilateral approach to cross-border M&A. 
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the problem of the NSB. Assuming relatively efficient capital 
markets, if an SOE (with a public float) or a government-
influenced POE were to adopt a “national” strategy that does 
not maximize shareholder value, the firm would be 
susceptible to takeover by acquirers with purely financial 
motives because the stock price would reflect the cost to 
shareholders of pursuing the national-welfare-maximizing 
strategy. A financially motivated buyer could purchase the 
SOE or government-influenced POE at a discount, eliminate 
the costs incurred due to policy channeling,148 and benefit 
from the increase in stock price. Over time, the capital and 
control markets would eliminate NSBs. A regime of mutual 
contestability would also eliminate complaints about the lack 
of reciprocity that exacerbate frictions over Chinese foreign 
investment.  
The European Union’s experience with its Takeover 
Directive demonstrates the challenges that a mutual 
contestability proposal would face on a global level.149 In 2001, 
in the effort to resolve a longstanding deadlock over adoption 
of the Takeover Directive, the European Commission 
convened a High Level Group of Company Law Experts.150 
Seeking to overcome national barriers to cross-border 
acquisitions in order to facilitate growth of a “single market” 
while assuring a “level playing field,” the expert group 
proposed a mandatory board neutrality rule and a 
“breakthrough” rule.151 The breakthrough rule would permit 
 
148 See supra Section III.A.1. 
149 See Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 Apr. 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L142) 12. 
150 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The International Relations Wedge in the 
Corporate Convergence Debate, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 161, 202 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 
2004). 
151 See Paul Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster & Emilie van de Walle 
de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool? 1–3 (European 
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 141/2010, 2010); see also THE 
HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, A MODERN REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE 1, 112, 128 (Nov. 4, 2002), 
www.ecgi.org/publications/winter.htm [https://perma.cc/4Y8E-DQ9Z]; 
Gordon, supra note 150, at 203. 
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the holder of a majority or required supermajority (and in no 
event more than seventy-five percent) of a company’s cash 
flow rights to “break-through” takeover impediments such as 
dual class common stock or super-majority voting 
requirements.152 The member states resisted these mutual 
contestability provisions on local efficiency grounds—the 
value of dual class common structures, common in 
Scandinavia, for example—as well as arguments that were 
more directly protectionist.153 The further objection was that 
the Directive’s provisions were under-inclusive: they did not 
attack impediments such as pyramidal structures and left 
limitations on member states’ “golden shares” to resolution by 
the European Court of Justice.154 The final Directive 
permitted states to choose whether to opt in to this (partial) 
mutual contestability regime and further permitted states 
and firms to resist bids from companies and jurisdictions that 
had opted against mutual contestability. It is, therefore, 
commonly regarded as not having advanced the cause of 
greater economic integration in the “single market” through 
cross-border M&A.155  
A mutual contestability regime is a heavy lift because it 
entails a general challenge to ownership and control 
structures that may have deep roots and even efficiency 
justifications. “Breakthrough” rules are particularly 
ineffective where the controller has a majority stock 
ownership position or exercises control through a complicated 
group structure, both of which are common features of state 
and private ownership of business enterprises in China. Thus, 
this Article proposes a governance structure within the firm 
and an administrative agent to examine and certify the 
 
152 See Gordon, supra note 150, at 203–04. 
153 For a subtle critique from Scandinavia, see Erik Berglöf & Mike 
Burkart, European Takeover Regulation, 18 ECON. POL’Y 171 (2003). 
154 Gordon, supra note 150, at 204 n.80. 
155 See Wolfgang Drobetz & Peyman Momtaz, Corporate Governance 
Convergence in the European M&A Market (Jan. 16, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2642487 [https://perma.cc/YY5F-
JB8C] (finding no increase in European Union cross-border M&A after 
adoption of the Takeover Directive and a decline in hostile bids). 
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private, non-state economic motives behind a proposed cross-
border M&A. The proposed structure builds an enforcement 
mechanism using internal governance features rather than 
relying on self-enforcing capital market pressures. It is 
designed to supplement and complement, rather than to 
replace, national-level screening regimes. 
The starting point for our proposal is a global commitment 
to commercial or financial motivations for outbound 
investments by firms subject to government ownership or 
influence as a means of contributing to the stability of the 
global M&A market. There is precedent for building a 
coordinated investment regime from this starting point. The 
Santiago Principles for Sovereign Wealth Funds (“Santiago 
Principles”) were adopted in 2008 in response to concerns—
not unlike those relating to Chinese outbound investments 
currently—about the possibility that sovereign wealth fund 
(“SWF”) investments are motivated by non-commercial 
objectives.156  
The Santiago Principles are a nonbinding statement of 
generally accepted principles and practices that members of 
an “international working group” of SWFs have implemented 
or aspire to implement.157 They emphasize the “core principle” 
that “investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-
adjusted financial returns . . . based on economic and financial 
grounds.”158 Further, they call for transparency in the source 
of funding and operational independence of the SWF from the 
government owner.159 These principles—financially-oriented 
investment decisions, funding transparency, and 
independence from the government in its role as investor—
should also comprise the core principles of acquisitions in a 
cross-border M&A regime. 
 
156 See INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES “SANTIAGO 
PRINCIPLES” (Oct. 2008) [hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES], 
https://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples 
_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9273-KBNQ]. 
157 See id. at 4–5. 
158 Id. at 22. 
159 See id. at 4–5. 
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However, addressing concerns about national strategic 
motives in the SWF realm is considerably less complex than 
in the case of cross-border M&A. This is because SWF 
investments are portfolio investments that do not implicate 
changes in control of the target or the composition of its core 
governance organs. A parsimonious solution to the problem of 
asymmetric motives in SWF investments is readily available: 
the voting rights of equity acquired by a foreign-government-
controlled portfolio investor could be suspended (or voted in 
proportion to the votes of non-SWF shareholders) until the 
shares are sold to a non-government-affiliated investor.160 
The Santiago Principles do not adopt this approach, instead 
emphasizing the importance of ex ante disclosure of whether 
and how SWFs plan to vote in order to “dispel concerns about 
potential noneconomic or nonfinancial objectives.”161 Voting 
suspension is obviously an untenable proposition in an 
acquisition of control or of any significant stake by a buyer 
seeking to influence the target. Ex ante disclosure of financial 
motives is useful, but it is not credible as a signaling device 
because governments can (and often do) say one thing but do 
another. Thus, a commitment to financial investment motives 
is only a starting point, but one that could readily be added to 
the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment 
Policymaking, adopted in 2016 when China held the 
presidency of the G20.162 Borrowing from the Santiago 
Principles, the multilateral regime should contemplate the 
creation of a standing group of peer-monitoring and 
information-sharing to evaluate on-going compliance. 
 
160 See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds 
and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2008). 
161 SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 156, at 23. 
162 G20 Guiding Principles, supra note 19. These are non-binding 
principles whose objectives are to foster an open and transparent 
environment for investment, to promote “coherence in national and 
international investment policymaking,” and to encourage sustainable 
development. Id. at 1. As such, a commitment to financially oriented 
investment, funding transparency, and independence from the government 
is highly consistent with the G20 Guiding Principles. 
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As an alternative to a G20 engagement, the cross-border 
eligibility regime could be fashioned under the auspices of 
OECD, an organization of thirty-five developed countries that 
also works with emerging economies like China. The OECD 
could organize a consultative process, the end point of which 
should be: first, articulating a commitment to own-firm 
financial, commercial objectives in outbound M&A, not at the 
behest of a government; second, crafting an “eligibility 
regime” to monitor adherence to this commitment for firms 
where government involvement raises difficult verification 
questions; and third, establishing a secretariat that would 
evaluate initial and continuing compliance with the eligibility 
regime. This set-up would not require governments to agree 
to forgo state ownership or policy channeling, but would 
rather allow firms that engage in cross-border M&A to opt into 
a regime designed to assure that outbound acquisitions 
adhere exclusively to own-firm financial, commercial 
objectives.  
The eligibility regime would be triggered for any firm 
whose governance is subject to intervention by a political 
party or government, through (a) state ownership of the firm’s 
equity, (b) mandatory representation by members of a 
political party or government in the corporation’s governance 
organs such as its board of directors or other committees, or 
(c) a government-held golden share or equivalent veto rights 
over major corporate decisions.163 Importantly, this eligibility 
regime would be a threshold set of requirements that must be 
met before a firm can make a cross-border acquisition. It is 
emphatically not a blanket prohibition against cross-border 
acquisitions by all SOEs. The eligibility criteria are designed 
to make it possible for an acquirer to make a credible 
commitment that its cross-border acquisition proposal is 
 
163 The secretariat would also have to be vested with a certain amount 
of discretion to trigger the eligibility regime where a firm does not meet any 
of the formal triggers but nonetheless appears susceptible to government 
influence in its cross-border M&A activity. Factors that might be considered 
in the exercise of this discretion could include the amount of government 
contracts and government-linked financing the firm receives and the 
backgrounds of its principal investors and top managers. 
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motivated by private commercial objectives rather than 
national strategic objectives.  
A firm subject to the eligibility regime would be eligible to 
engage in cross-border M&A if it met the following 
requirements: 
(i) the company commits in its charter or other 
constitutive documents to undertake foreign 
acquisitions solely for own-firm financial or 
commercial objectives and not at the behest of any 
government; 
(ii) a significant portion, twenty-five percent, of the 
company’s cash flow rights are available for purchase 
by foreign shareholders; 
(iii) the company’s governance structure provides for 
independent directors comprising at least twenty-five 
percent of the board (but not fewer than two) who will 
be nominated by foreign shareholders;  
(iv) in advance of a public acquisition proposal, the 
independent directors are required under the 
acquirer’s governance documents to prepare a report 
for subsequent public release that attests to the own-
firm financial or commercial motivation and absence 
of government involvement in the acquisition 
decision; and  
(v) the company provides full disclosure of the sources 
of funding for the transaction before the transaction is 
final.  
A few clarifications are in order. First, we envision a 
twenty-five percent free float requirement, with the free float 
available for purchase by foreign or domestic investors, as a 
weak form of mutual contestability. Foreign investors would 
not necessarily have to own twenty-five percent of the shares. 
Rather, the substantial free float would effectively serve as a 
signal of openness by the firm to investment by a significant 
block of shareholders not affiliated with the relevant 
government. Second, our proposal vests authority to nominate 
the independent directors with the foreign investors on the 
theory that (a) these investors are likely to be sophisticated 
institutional investors, such as BlackRock, and (b) the 
reputational and other interests of such investors will cause 
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them to be objective in their analysis of the commercial, 
financial aims of a proposed transaction rather than simply 
backing management and the foreign government in favor of 
the acquisition. Third, a firm’s consideration of general 
licensure, tax, and other incentive-shaping schemes 
commonly employed by governments would not necessarily 
mean that an acquisition was at the government’s “behest.” 
The question would be the tightness of fit between the 
governmental scheme, the national strategic objective, and 
the specific action of the firm. Of course, in any particular 
case, the question may be a close one.  
Enforcement of the regime would consist of two elements: 
first, a secretariat that can evaluate whether a would-be 
acquirer satisfies the eligibility criteria both as a general 
matter in its governance set-up and as to the specific 
transaction; and second, national legislation that would 
permit rejection of a local target’s acquisition by an acquirer 
that does not meet the eligibility criteria.  
These eligibility criteria are chosen to reinforce one 
another. The availability of a twenty-five percent foreign float 
provides an opening for institutional investors, who have a 
major stake in preserving a flexible cross-border M&A regime 
because of the value thereby created. These minority 
shareholders are empowered to nominate—effectively to 
select—at least two independent directors. The independent 
directors have special fiduciary duties to assess the firm’s 
acquisition objectives and to verify both the commercial, 
financial motivation and the absence of government 
involvement in the particular acquisition decision. The 
acquirer is also separately obligated to disclose its funding 
sources for the acquisition, which should provide another 
occasion for critical scrutiny of a possible hidden 
governmental hand.  
Compliance with the eligibility regime could be woven into 
national cross-border merger review schemes through local 
law. In addition to specific national security concerns, a 
country could: (i) debar an acquirer that fails the eligibility 
criteria, (ii) reject specific transactions that fail the 
verification scheme, or (iii) debar an acquirer that initially 
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satisfied or appeared to satisfy the eligibility regime with 
respect to a transaction where facts emerge that indicate 
otherwise. The eligibility regime gains its force from its 
consequences in the national review process.  
VI. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
There are several possible objections to our proposal that 
merit response. The first is a general “welfarist” objection: 
what is the actual concern raised by a national strategic 
buyer? Target shareholders get higher prices and more 
investment flows into favored sectors, which should spur more 
innovation and risk-taking (much like the flood of venture 
capital finance). There is both a private and public answer. 
NSBs have a competitive advantage over conventional 
acquirers because of their access to lower-cost state finance 
and the implicit promise of state support if the acquisition is 
not successful in income statement terms. In other words, 
NSBs face soft budget constraints rather than hard budget 
constraints on acquisitive activity and deal pricing. NSB 
activity in the United States and the European Union could 
thus lead to distorted prices that adversely affect resource 
allocation in important sectors. Moreover, conventional 
acquirers could be deprived of access to competitively valuable 
technology or other resources, which would hamper their 
growth.  
The more serious concerns are public. In critical sectors 
like technology, the goal of national policy is to create 
“agglomeration economies,” that is, concentrations of 
expertise that build on one another for durable growth and 
innovation.164 There is a geographical component, reflected in 
an “industrial district” like Silicon Valley,165 but also a 
harder-to-specify human network that supplies energy and 
 
164 See generally Glaeser, supra note 11. 
165 See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE 
AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996); Ronald J. 
Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
575 (1999). 
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cross-fertilizing ingenuity. A critical feature of United States 
industrial policy is to foster such developments through 
private finance and open capital markets. The concern is that 
the NSB, applying a more directive industrial policy, could 
capture key inputs and channel them to NSB-home country 
advantage. More specifically, the concern is that Chinese 
NSBs could pursue such acquisitions on a scale that would 
shift the location of innovation, and thus durable economic 
growth, from the United States to China.166  
Whether these concerns are well-taken or merely scare-
mongering, large-scale NSB acquisitions are perceived by 
other governments as threatening and as violations of the 
existing order in cross-border M&A. Target-home-country 
protectionism is grudgingly accepted as part of the M&A 
game, as the European Union experience demonstrates, but 
acquirer-home-state aid or direction is a violation; it is the 
difference between offense and defense in state action. Our 
view is that NSB activity has injected instability into the 
cross-border M&A regime. As the developing pattern of 
United States, United Kingdom, and European Union 
responses demonstrate, Chinese NSB acquisitions could 
trigger a reaction that may radically transform the cross-
border M&A regime.  
The vetoed Broadcom-Qualcomm matter demonstrates 
this possibility.167 There was no threat to United States 
national security interests as conventionally understood. 
Indeed, except for its (temporary) Singaporean domicile, 
Broadcom was a thoroughly “American” firm, if we look to 
ownership by United States institutions and asset managers 
or the nationality of directors and senior managers. The 
Trump administration decided that Broadcom’s acquisition of 
 
166 See Enrico Moretti, The Local and Aggregate Effect of 
Agglomeration on Innovation: Evidence from High Tech Clusters (Working 
Paper, 2018), https://eml.berkeley.edu//~moretti/clusters.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WNL8-9U8U] (finding that the demise of Kodak was 
followed by an 11.2% productivity decline of non-Kodak inventors, as 
measured by patent data, and that a scientist’s move to a larger technology 
cluster leads to notable increases in such productivity).  
167 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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Qualcomm would undercut R&D investment in a 
telecommunications innovation, 5G, also pursued by Chinese 
rivals: “[A] shift to Chinese dominance in 5G would have 
substantial negative national security consequences for the 
United States.”168 The same objection could have been raised 
in the case of a United Kingdom or Swiss acquirer. Under the 
cover of Chinese NSB activity in the technology space, the 
United States government has opened the door to a national 
industrial policy screen for all cross-border M&A. Thus, it will 
be in the interests of all long-term players in the cross-border 
M&A market—all institutional investors, asset managers, 
sovereign wealth funds, and intermediaries—to work together 
to fashion a regime that will visibly constrain the pursuit of 
national strategic objectives by cross-country acquirers, 
especially China. This is what our eligibility regime aims to 
do.  
What is novel in the eligibility regime is the use of a 
corporate governance strategy to solve a problem of 
international relations. Over the past forty years, private and 
governmental actors have increasingly looked to the board of 
directors to address difficult regulatory matters and have 
enhanced the demands for director independence and 
engagement. Perhaps the most successful uses have been in 
the control of accounting fraud and in the sale of the firm. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley regime—which includes audit committee 
oversight of outside accounting experts—helped ensure there 
was no significant accounting fraud among large financial 
players during the 2008 Financial Crisis, despite the 
enormous financial stress and the incentives for book-
 
168 Mir, supra note 108. 
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cooking.169 The special committee process allows the 
independent directors to marshal significant outside expertise 
to evaluate competing bids for the target and can produce the 
simulacrum of arm’s length bargaining even in conflict cases. 
These examples lead us to the belief that an eligibility regime 
employing independent director investigation and 
certification can credibly evaluate an acquirer’s motives for a 
transaction.  
The final issue is whether China in particular would 
subject its firms to an “eligibility regime” for cross-border 
M&A. The proposal would not require China to give up its 
pattern of state ownership or state-guided industrial policy, 
but it would limit China’s ability to use cross-border M&A as 
a mechanism for the pursuit of state strategy. The proposal 
would not require China to accede to an international 
agreement, but merely to acquiescence to the willingness of 
SOEs and POEs to submit to the eligibility regime, which 
would not affect the ownership and governance of those firms. 
Obviously, such a regime would not be the first choice of 
Chinese leadership. But to emphasize what we wrote earlier: 
without some type of intervention along the lines we suggest, 
the present cross-border M&A regime may unravel. President 
Xi has spoken forcefully in favor of openness in trade and 
investment, emphasizing that “[t]o grow its economy, China 
must have the courage to swim in the vast ocean of the global 
market.”170 Support for a multilateral regime that constrains 
mercantilist, national-strategic motivations for deals would 
 
169 There is some evidence that Lehman Brothers engaged in 
aggressive accounting to dress up quarterly reports to divert attention from 
its highly leveraged balance sheet. See Report of Examiner Anton R. 
Valukas at 962, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., 422 B.R. 407 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-13555), (discussing Repo 105 transactions). 
But significant accounting fraud in large banks and investment banks was 
not among the crisis causes explored in depth by, e.g., the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf [perma.cc/E7EZ-LE6A]. 
170 Xi, supra note 26. 
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demonstrate China’s commitment to sound governance of the 
global market for cross-border M&A.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has highlighted a problem in the cross-border 
M&A regime, the national strategic buyer, whose motives for 
engaging in an acquisition violate an implicit assumption 
upon which this global market operates: that both selling 
shareholders and foreign acquirers act in pursuit of 
commercial and financial, rather than industrial policy, 
objectives. It has offered a proposed multilateral response to 
this problem drawn from corporate governance best practices 
that operationalizes principles of international investment 
already agreed to by the G20. 
Reasonable people may disagree about the workability of 
our proposal, and we welcome a debate about alternative 
approaches. However, given the current depth and scope of 
concern over Chinese acquisitions in the United States, 
Europe, and elsewhere, it is prudent to consider ways in which 
the operation of this important global market can be adjusted 
to take account of China’s emergence as a major player. We 
believe that a multilateral approach is preferable to continued 
tightening of national security screening regimes at the 
national level. At a minimum, we hope to have demonstrated 
that the current bilateral, transactional approach to inbound-
investment screening on the basis of national security is not 
the only, or necessarily the best, way to alleviate concerns over 
the NSB. 
 
